Abstract-Deploying defense mechanisms in routers holds DoS attacks, which makes such defenses more desirable than promises for protecting infrastructure resources such as link more reactive solutions such as traceback [4], [22]. bandwidth or router buffers against network Denial-of-Service
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
against more subtle malicious behaviors posed by individual Network Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, or bandwidth users, or flows 1 For example, the ACC system, which is attacks, that directly target network infrastructure resources designed to regulate bandwidth hogs that induce significant such as link bandwidth and/or router buffer are an important congestion, can be defeated by an attacker that carefully threat to the reliability of the Internet. Network DoS attacks controls its rate increase to avoid ever triggering severe losses. are usually perpetrated by compromising a large number of In contrast, flow level defenses rely on fine-grain descriptors "zombie" hosts and commandeering them to source flooding that specify the expected traffic profile of a well-behaving user.
traffic towards a target link or network. During an attack, the For example, the RED-PD system incorporates the notion of "TCP-friendliness," and regulates flows transmitting at a rate amount of flooding traffic is often large enough to overwhelm gabnormally) gan ates flows Unfortun ate the target, and disrupt the performance of normal users.
(abnormally) higher than a standard TCP flow. Unfortunately, To combat network DoS attacks, it is natural to deploy though this is effective against high bandwidth attackers, it mechanismsnaround criticalcnetworkiresources to sereaa remains vulnerable to low-rate attackers that periodically blast first line of defense . This approach is taken in router-based short traffic bursts. The fact that bursty ON-OFF attackers can defenses [19] , [18] , [13] , [14] , [27] that directly monitor the defeat a base RED-PD system was first identified in [17] , with usage of resources such as bandwidth or buffer. Router-based the "Shrew" attacker, and subsequently in [I I]. Our study [23] defenses rely on certain pre-defined "normal" system behav-confirmed these results, but focused on understanding the steep penalties. a wide variety of attacks. Ideally, it should keep the impact of an attacker to a level similar to that of a "normal" TCP flow, independent of the flooding strategy. In addition, the defense regulation techniques used by the ACC defense, is a promising system should be transparent to legitimate TCP users, i.e., approach for dealing with both such large-scale DDoS attacks impose minimal penalties on them. In order to understand how and the more pernicious attacks we focus on in this paper. to build defenses that can fulfill these goals, we first evaluate
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II, a set of schemes that represent likely choices for a successful we present the broad design space we consider for developing design. We find that performance is heavily dependent on the defense mechanisms. Section III explores different design time period (horizon) used to detect malicious behaviors, as choices within this space and motivates our choice of a well as the mechanism employed to filter suspicious traffic. In double horizon design. Section IV provides specific details on particular, a short horizon mechanism coupled with a stringent the proposed design, analyzes its complexity, and discusses regulation strategy, e.g., dropping all out-of-profile traffic, is configuration issues. In Section V, we demonstrate that the very effective at eliminating malicious traffic. However, as design is effective against a wide variety of attacks in different flow rates commonly fluctuate over small time scales, such configurations. We discuss related studies in Section VI, and a scheme often ends up wrongly penalizing legitimate users. conclude the paper in Section VII. A long horizon mechanism that averages traffic over longer time intervals fares better in that respect, but is ineffective at throttling transient attackers, because it either fails to detect In this section, we introduce a generic design framework for them or reacts too slowly to their presence. flow level defenses. This framework allows us to capture the To overcome this dilemma, we propose a double horizon major factors that affect defense performance, and to identify defense architecture. The short horizon component relies on specific schemes of interest. a traffic profile looser than the standard TCP behavior, and Flow level defenses rely on an a priori definition of the allows for quick reaction to transient and high intensity "normal" behavior of individual flows, which they constantly attacks without sacrificing transparency. However, this does strive to enforce. Since TCP users dominate the Internet user not protect against steady and less aggressive attackers. This is community, it is reasonable to define "normal" user behavior the responsibility of the long horizon component that enforces based on how a TCP flow consumes link resources, i.e., to strict TCP conformance, but over a longer time interval to enforce TCP-friendliness. As shown in Fig. 1 , a typical flow avoid falsely identifying regular TCP rate fluctuations as level defense consists of two major components: a detection malicious. We provide evidences in support of this design, component and a regulation component, which are connected and demonstrate that it not only meets our design goals, but through a classifier. A flow violating the standard TCP profile, also that it can be implemented using simple hash table data once identified by the detector, will be classified as potentially structures, with a processing and storage cost affordable even malicious and have its traffic filtered inside the regulation for very high link speeds. component before entering the link queue. In this paper, The investigation carried out in this paper is a comprehen-we assume the defense systems relies on a RED queue [8] sive exploration of the design space associated with building that implements random dropping. As we will discuss, this robust router-based defenses that remain efficient across a facilitates estimating the rate of TCP flows. In the following, broad range of attacks. Specifically, the defense is able to we elaborate on the design choices for the detection and significantly curtail the impact of an attacker to no more regulation components, respectively. than that of a regular TCP user, no matter how it varies its traffic. This being said, attackers can still be successful in A Detection Strateg disrupting normal traffic if they manage to summon a large
The detection component measures the resource usage of enough number of hosts, e.g., as in the case of BotNets attacks all active flows traversing the link and identifies flows that [15] or reflector attacks [21] . In such cases, it is virtually do not conform to "normal" TCP behavior. Fulfilling this impossible to distinguish an attacking host from a legal host, task requires two different operations: tracking the baseline solely on the basis of their individual traffic. Defending against behavior of a TCP flow and measuring the resource usage of such attacks calls for different measures to identify attackers. incoming flows. We discuss this further in Section VI, in which we argue 1) Profiling TCP-friendly Behalvior. A common approach that combining the defense mechanism proposed in this paper for characterizing normal TCP behavior is the "TCP-friendly" with certain aggregate mechanisms, e.g., the detection and concept [7] , which categorizes as conformant any flow sending ni=ni+1 estimator 3 with a history length of h intervals: (1) detector may wrongly estimate the traffic volume of flows if that volume is measured over a relatively short horizon. Using where r and p are the round-trip time and the steady state loss a very long horizon alleviates this problem, but raises the event rate experienced by that flow [7] .
risk of ignoring flows that significantly violate TCP behavior To identify non-conformant users, it is necessary to obtain at short time scales. Therefore, it is crucial to select the an accurate estimation of f (r, p). Since the parameter r "right" time horizon(s) to efficiently trade off transparency is typically pre-configured by the defense 2, estimating p and accuracy.
becomes the main challenge. There are two factors that make
We discuss next options for measuring traffic. A straightthis task non-trivial. First, the loss levels seen by distinct flows forward approach is to update nm upon each packet arrival.
may be different. Fortunately, this should be less of an issue Obviously, this is not a scalable solution. We argue that a for a RED queue, since RED drops packets randomly, and thus defense system should rely on sampling techniques to reduce helps evenly distribute loss events across flows. Consequently, the number of packets or flows that needs to be remembered. In the loss event rate experienced by a single flow can be inferred this paper, we focus on a simple random sampling technique 4. from the overall link loss rate observed at the local router [10] . Random sampling selects every incoming packet with a certain The second issue regarding estimating p is the selection of an probability s. As shown in Fig. 2 3Other moving average schemes with unequal weights, e.g., the exponential interval is indexed with 0, and the previous with I and so on. weighted moving average (EWMA) algorithm, can also be used. We found Each interval keeps its own set of counters for recording the that the choice of a specific averaging scheme has minor impact on the volume of transit flows. Let nm denote the value of the counter performance differences across distinct defenses.
4There have been a number of recent works [6] , [16] , [12] that address assigned to flow i in the kth measurement interval. Then, the issue of how to apply advanced sampling schemes to measure traffic the expected volume of traffic flow i sends in Tk seconds, efficiently. Though these schemes can increase the accuracy of traffic ma denoted as ?J, can be estimated using a moving average (MA) surement in particular instances, we expect the impact of a specific sampling technique to be smaller than that of the horizon setting. As we shall see, an effective defense scheme can be built upon a random sampling technique as 2We explore the impact of a pre-configured r on TCP flows with different long as it operates with an appropriate horizon(s). round-trip times in Section IV-B. 5To account for variable size packets, rib, ni and ntT can all be byte counts. measurement results nm and nT from the detector, and assigns d (d > 1). A regulator that employs both the CT-IR scheme to flow i a dropping probability pi equal to:
and the slack only applies cut-tail dropping on a flow i when nm exceeds an inflated TCP-friendly profile of d. nT.
-A(3)
This enables the regulation component to focus on flows that significantly violate the standard TCP profile, and therefore throughout the next interval. It is easy to see that when the makes it possible for a regulator to achieve both transparency system is stable (f(r, p) is a constant), and there are no and fast response even when a very small horizon length is sampling errors, Eq. (3) computed at the end of a measurement used. On the other hand, as this scheme relies on a looser interval is exactly equal to the fraction of excess traffic flow i definition of "normal traffic", it alone would not be able to generates in the most recent horizon. Thus, by probabilistically enforce strict TCP-friendliness. dropping packets accordingly, the regulator attempts to filter We have thus far reviewed several possible design choices out all excess traffic of a non-conformant flow and bring its for flow level defenses. Specifically, defenses detect malicious rate back to f(r,p).
traffic by measuring the resource consumption of flows and We name the above regulation policy the "Progressive comparing it with the maximally allowable TCP-friendly rate Dropping with Delayed Response" (PD-DR) strategy, as it pro-estimated at the local link. Once identified, a flow can be gressively tracks down how much a flow violates the standard regulated according to either one of three strategies, namely, TCP behavior. For a "new" non-conformant flow appearing PD-DR, CT-IR, or CT-IR with slack. in the system, the PD-DR strategy exhibits a natural delay in applying its penalty, as obtaining an accurate estimation III. EVALUATION OF DESIGN CHOICES of the amount of excess traffic can only be achieved after that flow has been monitored for an entire horizon. Thus,
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the aforewe suspect when TH is relatively large, this type of defense mentioned defense schemes through a number of case studies. may not effectively regulate malicious flows with a highly Our evaluation is qualitative in nature, as our focus is on variable rate process. For instance, it is possible that when the comparing the relative performance of these schemes and regulator finally comes up with a correct dropping decision, the exploring the impact of various design parameters, so as to attacking flow has already disappeared, making the regulator's understand how to build a successful system. For both the efforts futile.
PD-DR and the CT-IR schemes, we let TH = TK (h = 1), 2) Cut-Tail Dropping With Instant Response: The second and mainly explore the influence of the horizon length TH. 7. strategy we consider attempts to overcome the intrinsic limi-As for the CT-IR with slack, we configure its horizon length tations of the PD-DR scheme, by reacting to suspicious traffic to r = 40ms, i.e., one round-trip time of a standard TCP flow, at the earliest possible time. To achieve a fast response, this and investigate how its performance changes with the slack strategy only monitors traffic seen in the current measurement 6. For this initial investigation, all schemes use a sampling interval, i.e., using a history length h equal to 1. 6. Moreover, probability of s = 0.1. instead of waiting until the end of a measurement interval,
We carry out our investigation using the topology of Fig. 3 , this regulation mechanism starts penalizing a flow immediately which consists of one bottleneck link with a capacity of after it has been classified as malicious. Specifically, for any C Mb/sec. The RED queue on the link has configurable given flow i, the regulator compares nm with nT upon every parameters minth, maXth and qweight, and has a maximal update, and if nm > nT, all subsequent packets from flow i are size of B packets. The link is shared by NT long-lived TCP dropped for the rest of the interval. This process repeats anew flows (with no window size limitations) and NA malicious in each measurement interval. In an ideal situation without flows, and we test the efficacy of the defenses in throttling sampling errors, this mechanism can also correctly filter out attacking traffic on that link. The access links of all TCP users all excess traffic. are assumed to also have a speed of C Mb/sec and a delay of
We name this regulation scheme the "Cut-tail Dropping with yms. We assume that each attacking source is connected over Instant Response" (CT-IR) strategy. Clearly, in order for a CT-a high-speed access link of, say 622 Mb/sec, and with a 5ms IR regulator to respond quickly to sudden traffic violations, delay. Parameters such as NA, NT, C y, as well as minth a small measurement interval length must be used. However, and maxth can all be varied. Unless stated explicitly, we use because of intrinsic TCP rate fluctuations, this is also likely the following default setting: NA 1 (a single attacker), to trigger frequent false detections and penalizations, which is NT = 16, y = lOms (40ms round-trip propagation delay), detrimental to achieving a high degree of transparency. C = 45Mb/sec, and consider TCP Reno users sending 500
3) CT-IR with Slack: To reduce the potential damage a byte packets. In addition, the default configuration of the RED CT-IR regulator could impose on regular TCP flows, we queue assumes B = 1000 packets, minth = 100 packets, extend the basic CT-JR scheme by introducing a slack factor maxcth =300 packets and qweight =0.002. The effect of changing mimth and maith will be discussed later.
6Such a regulation mechanism may also be configured with h > 1. However, this will slow down the reaction speed and can be shown to reduce the regulation scheme's efficacy against bursty attackers. We therefore do not 7Though the PD-DR scheme can be configured with h > 1, the specific consider such cases.
value of h was found to have a minor impact for a given TH. lower undue penalization on TCP. This explains the "hump" The slack CT-IR scheme fares better in this respect, but its use in the figure, which prevents TCP flows from attaining more of a slack factor allows out-of-profile traffic to pass through the than 75% of their original throughput. As a result, the overall regulator. This translates into poor performance when dealing performance of a slack CT-IR defense remains worse than that with persistent high-rate attackers. Efficiently throttling this of a PD-DR defense. type of attacker calls for a long horizon mechanism that C. Scenario 3: One Transient Attacker continuously filters traffic, such as the PD-DR mechanism.
Because both the PD-DR scheme and the slack CT-IR In this sub-section, we consider a highly transient ON-OFF scheme achieve transparency and efficiency for different types attacker that floods at 1.5C for 40msec, and then stays idle of attacks, it seems appealing to combine them to leverage for 960msec before turning active again. As the attacker's 1-their complementary strengths. In the next section, we present second attack cycle synchronizes with the TCP retransmission the design of such a hybrid architecture. timeout duration, it can frequently force TCP flows into timeout. In [17] , it was shown that this type of attacker can IV. A DOUBLE HORIZON DEFENSE DESIGN almost shut off TCP flows without being detected by REDIn this section, we review the architecture design and PD. We therefore, intend to test if one of the three defense configuration of our double horizon defense. Due to space strategies can be used to throttle this type of attacker.
constraint, we only highlight the main ideas. Full details can From Fig. 6(a) , we see that neither the CT-IR scheme nor be found in an extended technical report [24] .
the PD-DR scheme is efficient in thwarting the attacker. By checking trace data, we found that the CT-IR defense did filter A. Overview ofArchitecture Design out most of the attacking traffic when TH is small, e.g., TH = Our double horizon design includes two different mechaIr, primarily because of its fast response speed. However, this nisms: the slack CT-IR scheme and the PD-DR scheme. The was negated by its poor transparency, which when combined goal of the slack CT-IR scheme is to throttle short term traffic with the remaining attacking traffic, caused TCP flows to lose spikes. Hence, we configure its horizon length to Ir to ensure more than 40% of their initial throughput. Compared with the a fast response speed. In contrast, the PD-DR scheme should CT-IR scheme, the PD-DR defense responds even slower for rely on a relatively long horizon to enforce strict long-term a given TH, yet exhibits similar transparency issues. Hence, it TCP behavior. In our design, we assume TK = kr so that it results in even worse TCP performance. When TH becomes has a total horizon length of hk round-trips. In the rest of the large, both schemes perform poorly in regulating the attacker. paper, we denote these two mechanisms as the "short horizon This is because the long-term rate of the attacker is merely mechanism" and the "long horizon mechanism" respectively. 0.06C, a value similar to that of a standard TCP flow in steady Both the short horizon and the long horizon mechanisms state. Consequently, most of the attacking traffic manages to calibrate their baseline behavior using the estimated loss rate evade the defense and significantly reduce TCP throughput. p provided by the router queue. In all other respects, the two Fig. 6(b) identifies the slack CT-IR mechanism running at mechanisms operate independently, as they rely on separate TH = Ir as the best defense scheme among the three when sampling processes and generate their own dropping decisions. dealing with bursty ON-OFF attackers. In particular, its short Both mechanisms track active flows using a standard hash horizon length enables the defense to rapidly react to transient table data structure, in which each flow is represented by traffic surges, while the inflated traffic profile significantly a specific flow entry. Fig. 7 shows sample formats for the reduces the possibility of wrongly penalizing legitimate TCP short horizon flow entry (top) and the long horizon flow entry users. As a result, the defense is able to drop most of the (bottom). Specifically, a flow is characterized by a flow ID attacking traffic without degrading TCP performance. Fig. 6(b) field (FID) , which is a hash value computed over the source also shows there exists a broad range of values for d that yield and destination addresses of its packets. The short horizon flow a relatively small throughput reduction. For instance, TCP entry uses one counter to record mO, while the long horizon throughput decrease can be kept within 25% for d between flow entry contains (h + 1) counters, one for recording ni, 1.5 and 5.5. As we will see later, such insensitivity facilitates and the others reserved for the h most recent measurement the selection of a default d.
intervals. For a newly arrived packet, the system checks both FID (9 + B(h, k) + 2h)Cs1(h + 1)kr/P p ranging from 0.01% to 5%. Fig. 9 (a) plots the resulting TCP +(8 + B(h, k))Cssr/P (4) throughput ratio as a function of p. The figure shows that TCP throughput reduction is less than 5% in all scenarios, and is B. Parameter Selection and Validation less than 1% when NT > 8. The throughput loss is higher for We now summarize how we select the default parameters. smaller values of NT because in these cases, the chance that Our main goal is to ensure adequate transparency for regular multiple TCP flows are simultaneously penalized is higher.
TCP flow, whilekeepingmemory rquiremets affodable.
To achieve efficiency at ultra-high link speeds, e.g., 160Gb/sec or beyond, We contend that ensuring transparency calls for a rate of loss [3] advocates using a buffer size that is as small as 1 -2%,7 of what is adopted in current router desi gns. Investigating how to make our design efficient for 8We assume a CAM-based implementation of the hash tables as in [20] . such high speeds is left for future work.
Real Internet traffic exhibits a wide range of round-trip B. Defense Efficacy: Single Attacking Flow latencies [9] . We consider next a scenario where TCP flows
In the following, we explore the efficacy of the double with heterogeneous round-trip propagation delays are multi-horizon design based on the impact factor it achieves. As plexed. Specifically, we consider aggregating 46 TCP flows, a benchmark, we start with the default configuration of which are divided into 23 groups with their round-trip delays Section III where there is only a single attacking flow. For evenly distributed between 20ms and 460ms. Fig. 9(b) shows comparison purposes, we also measure the impact factor of for each group, the throughput before and after turning on the RED-PD defense.
the defense. It is easy to observe that the defense heavily 1) Attacking Schemes. We characterize the traffic patter penalized flows that were more aggressive than standard TCP of a single attacking source using a generic ON-OFF model.
flows, e.g., (group 1) TCP flows with a 20ms round-trip delay. An We have also tested the default parameter choice in two Particularly, when b is small, these sources are essentially other configurations, one involving the aggregation of web-the bursty "Shrew" attackers we tested before. At the other like traffic, and the other involving a topology with multiple extreme, when b 1000ms the source always stays "ON" bottlenecks. In [24], we showed that in both scenarios, this and becomes a CBR attacker 10 default configuration results in only very limited throughput 2) CBR Attacker. Fig. 10(a) reports the impact factor of a reduction for TCP flows.
CBR attacker with a variable flooding rate, for both the double
V. EFFICACY OF THE DOUBLE HORIZON DESIGN
horizon defense and the RED-PD defense. The figure shows This section is devoted to the evaluation of the defense that the impact factor peaks at 1.3 for R = 0.15C and is capabilities of the proposed double horizon design, as well as smaller than 1 after that, which shows that the defense was comparing its efficiency to that of another well-known flow reasonably successful in limiting the impact of the attacker level defense, namely, the RED-PD system. In contrast to to a level close to that of a regular TCP flow. This value Section III, the evaluation in this section is quantitative in is still a bit larger than 1, because the standard TCP profile, nature. In particular, our goal is to measure the extent to which i.e., f (r, p), slightly overestimates the actual TCP sending rate the defense system can regulate attacking traffic, based on the by not considering time-out events [7] . Another interesting notion of "impact factor". phenomenon is that when R becomes sufficiently large, e.g.,
A. Performance Metrics larger than 0.3C, the impact of the attacker actually diminishes. This is because the attacking traffic then triggers both The "impact factor" is a measure that captures the average the short and long horizon mechanisms, and is thus penalized impact of a single attacking flow, in terms of the equivalent twice. As the amount of extra penalty increases with the degree number of regular TCP flows that would have the same of violation, an attacker with a higher rate injects a smaller effect. Specifically, assuming that launching NA attackers on amount of traffic into the queue. We believe this to be a a link with NT standard TCP flows yields a TCP throughput desirable property, as it discourages an attacker from using ratio of THr, i.e., the total TCP throughput is reduced by high flooding rates. Fig. 10(a) also plots the impact factor of 100(1 -THr)%. If further assuming that standard TCP the attacker under the RED-PD defense. As we can observe, flows share link capacity in an equal manner, this level of the RED-PD defense can also limit the impact of the attacker performance degradation can also be achieved by adding below a certain level. However, the filtering of out-of-profile NT = NT(1/THr-1) standard TCP flows. The impact factor traffic is not as effective as in our design, as F can reach a XT, is thus defined as the ratio of NT over NA: OurImllcltotloof an ideal defense system iS that it should 3 NOFAtce:Rslsfra NOFatce limit the impact of any attacking flow to no more than that 3 NOFAtce.Rslsfra NOFatce of a normal TCP flow. This translates into a requirement for aerpre nFg 0b,vaalglgpo fteipc a defense to achieve XF < 1. When this is not feasible, the 10There is another case where both R and b/I are fixed, but b varies. Given closer XF is to 1, the better the defense. the minor effect of varying b, we omit the results here. between successive addresses. This strategy generates a series aggregating heterogeneous TCPflows, as well as changing link of staggered ON-OFF sources as it cycles through all NA queue configurations. We verified that in all these scenarios, addresses in a period of max (1, bNA) seconds. When NA < the default defense can successfully identify all four attacking 1/b, the padded idle period ensures that the impact of every strategies, and limit their impact to a level similar to that address is evenly distributed across the attack cycle.
of TCP-friendly traffic. We refer to [24] (Section V.D) for iv. Congregate Cycle: Instead of distributing the effect of a complete presentation of results. different addresses across the attack cycle, the second strategy, i.e., the "congregate cycle" strategy attempts to aggregate their VI. RELATED WORKS impact in a short time period. As shown in Fig. 11(b) , within a
In this section, we briefly survey related network DoS cycling round the attacker floods with each address for b/NA countermeasures, and compare them with the scheme proposed (b = 40msec) seconds consecutively. Upon the completion of in this paper in terms of both efficacy and applicability. one round, the attacker stays idle for 960msec before blasting
Earlier works such as traceback [22] , [4] attempt to identify again, which creates a 1-second attack cycle. The rationale of the source(s) of attacking traffic in order to shut them off. this strategy, is to maximize the impact of every traffic burst. Traceback mechanisms allow a victim to reconstruct the inIn particular, recall that if one address is used continuously coming path of attacking traffic, based on information elicited for 40msec, most of the associated traffic will be filtered. from intermediate routers. Traceback is, however, not effective Hence, rather than distributing many such "weakened" bursts in rapidly stopping an ongoing attack, as collecting enough over time, as is the case in the "padded cycle" strategy, this information to identify the sources often takes a long time. strategy attempts to inject the entire burst into the defense by
Router-based defenses explicitly tackle the issue of onusing a smaller "ON" period for each address.
line throttling of DoS attacks. As previously mentioned, 2) Results: Fig. 12 reports the resulting F for cases where router-based defenses can be categorized into aggregate level NA increases from 1 to 32. Fig. 12(a) focuses on the double defenses and flow level defenses. Aggregate level defenses horizon defense, while Fig. 12(b) studies the RED-PD defense. rely on coarse-grain descriptor, namely, "traffic aggregates" The main observation from Fig. 12(a) is that all four strategies to identify suspicious traffic. For example, during extreme exhibit an F that decreases with NA. Moreover, when NA congestion, the ACC system [18] classifies high-bandwidth becomes large, all curves settle at a level below 1. Among the aggregates sharing a common destination address (or address three flooding strategies creating ON-OFF traffic patterns, the clusters) as malicious. This, as demonstrated in [18] , enables curve corresponding to the "Padded Cycle" strategy decays the the defense to detect and contain large-scale, brute-force DDoS fastest, In contrast, the "Congregate Cycle" strategy exhibits attacks in many typical scenarios. The main challenge faced by the slowest decay in F. This suggests that TCP traffic is more aggregate level defenses, is the difficulty of defining suitable susceptible to large bursts that are relatively far apart, than to aggregates and their expected overall behavior as well as many small, evenly distributed bursts. An off-line examination setting proper triggers for enacting traffic regulation. This indicates that this is because a large burst can shut off a makes such defenses vulnerable to sophisticated attackers significant fraction of TCP flows by forcing them into time-relying on carefully crafted traffic patterns (bursts) [23] . In out, while small bursts only decrease (halve) the TCP window contrast, as flow-level schemes monitor every user for conforsize, which has a lesser effect. Nevertheless, when NA > 25, mance with a particular profile, e.g., TCP friendliness, they are even the "congregate" strategy ends up with an F smaller than more effective against individual attackers. In particular, the 1. The "Unsynchronized ON-OFF" strategy has a behavior that double horizon defense proposed in this paper can successfully is in between that of the above two strategies. This is due to confine attackers so that their individual impact does not the random activation of attacking flows, which results in the exceed that of a regular TCP flow. On the other hand, a ON periods of some sources being spread apart, while others large number of attackers, even if constrained to be TCPcluster together creating a congregate effect.
friendly, can eventually overwhelm any flow level defense. The results of Fig. 12(a) confirms the efficacy of the double Our contention is not only that the two represent very different horizon design. Fig. 12(b) paints an opposite picture for types of attacks, but that it is possible to design a reasonably the RED-PD system. Specifically, as ON-OFF patterns are effective overall defense by combining efficient flow-level not effectively regulated, attackers using the "Unsynchronized schemes, such as the one proposed in this paper, together ON-OFF" or the "Padded Cycle" strategies can achieve an with aggregate level mechanisms. For example, upon detecting impact factor larger than 200. Only the "Congregate Cycle" that the double horizon defense alone fails to limit link strategy yields an F that actually decreases with NA. This congestion to a certain level, extra scanning could be activated is because most of the attacking traffic already bypasses the to detect and regulate suspicious traffic aggregates that are defense when NA = 1. As the strategy does not introduce likely associated with large-scale DDoS attacks. Validating the "new" traffic, the average impact of each address diminishes feasibility and efficacy of such a combination is part of the as NA gets larger.
work we are currently pursuing.
3) Alternative Configurations. Apart from the default conKill-Bots [15] is a server side defense mechanism aimed figuration, we also evaluated the efficacy of our defense system at thwarting CyberSlam, i.e., massive DDoS attacks targetin several other settings, e.g., multiplexing web-like traffc, ing web server resources such as CPU, memory, disk and other router-based mechanisms such as ACC-Pushback.
